

Brick rigs armed forces full#
To best provide a balanced analysis of the PLA’s strengths and weaknesses, analysts and policymakers should focus on assessing not only military modernization strengths, but also military reform weaknesses.Įnjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. High-tech new weapons are useful for enabling a military’s lethality, but current military reform shortfalls hinder the PLA’s ability to employ such hardware to achieve China’s strategic political goals. While the military modernization bin represents the PLA’s image of strength and tends to garner the majority of attention in press reports, the military reform bin receives less fanfare but highlights current PLA weaknesses. There is, however, a second bin of advancements I label as “military reform,” which is defined less by hardware and more by institutional evolutions such as a restructuring of PLA hierarchy and a reprioritization of realistic training in integrated joint operations. I categorize this technological advancement as “military modernization,” defined by the development of exquisite weapon systems and improvements of warfare materiel to meet military requirements. New missiles and advanced platforms represent only a small part of the PLA’s endeavor to achieve parity with its adversaries. Get briefed on the story of the week, and developing stories to watch across the Asia-Pacific.
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As evidence of the rising PLA threat, Admiral Philip Davidson highlighted in his written testimony the commissioning of new and advanced air and naval platforms such as China’s “first aerial-refuelable bomber, the H-6N” and “the LUYANG III MOD guided-missile destroyer provides the PLA Navy greater maneuverability and flexibility.” He continued his assessment of the growing PLA threat, emphasizing its “pursuing a range of advanced weaponry, including electromagnetic railguns, hypersonic glide vehicles, and land-attack and anti-ship supersonic cruise missiles.” Diplomat Brief Weekly Newsletter N technology advances that increase joint force lethality, as well as the expansion of long-range precision fire capabilities. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) commander’s March 2021 testimony in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee regarding how his command plans to keep pace with Chinese technological modernization. The Two Halves of Assessing PLA Military Power and AdvancementsĪlarmist analysis that lacks balance between the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) strengths and weaknesses is exemplified in the U.S.

In this piece I will highlight imbalances that exist across current analyses of China’s military and provide complementary evaluations of existing weaknesses that analysts should incorporate into military power assessments. To avoid creating the anxiety Haas describes, analysts and policymakers must ensure that assessments of Chinese military power are equally informed by its projected strengths and current shortfalls. Analyses that focus exclusively on the projected images of strength are only incorporating half of the evidence. He argues that “policymakers in Washington must be able to distinguish between the image Beijing presents and the realities it confronts.”īy developing a clear and comprehensive picture of both Chinese strengths and weaknesses policymakers can better inform decision-makers on key competition questions. Haas speaks directly to how successful authoritarian regimes project strength while concealing weakness by controlling information leaving their borders. Such an alarmist attitude leads to increased anxiety among analysts and policymakers but is not based on the totality of the evidence. On March 3, Ryan Haas published an article in Foreign Affairs cautioning analysts and policymakers against adopting an exclusively alarmist attitude toward China.
